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Abstract 
 
This paper proposes to promote autonomy in digital 
ecosystems so that it provides agents with information 
to improve the behavior of the digital ecosystem in 
terms of stability. This work proposes that, in digital 
ecosystems, autonomous agents can provide 
fundamental services and information. The final goal is 
to run the ecosystem, generate novel conditions and let 
agents exploit them. A set of evaluation measures must 
be defined as well. We want to provide an outline of 
some global indicators, such as heterogeneity and 
diversity, and establish relationships between agent 
behavior and these global indicators to fully 
understand interactions between agents, and to 
understand the dependence and autonomy relations 
that emerge between the interacting agents. Individual 
variations, interaction dependencies, and 
environmental factors are determinants of autonomy 
that would be considered. The paper concludes with a 
discussion of situations when autonomy is a milestone.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
One of the main challenges in current applications of 
multi-agent technologies in relation with human 
operators or users is how to ensure a coherent behavior 
of the system without limiting the autonomy of the 
agents within. Addressing this issue needs a global 
study of what could be the rights and duties of agents 
in such systems and how to balance both while 
preserving the autonomy of the agents and the 
prerogatives of the human operators or users. 
As far as agents are concerned, a lot of work has 
been done in the areas of models, frameworks, 
coordination languages and protocols, planning and 
decision algorithms. Therefore agents are provided 
with tools they use to coordinate their activities, but 
hardly to decide themselves on what they should do, 
especially in contexts of mixed initiative with human 
operators or users. For instance, organizational 
structures, norms, institutions or constraints are 
imposed to agents in an attempt to achieve the desired 
functioning of the system. 
What at the system level is perceived as an attempt 
to achieve order in some sense may be considered at 
the agents' level to be a control on their autonomy. 
Autonomy is one of the salient features of multi-agent 
systems and defining and identifying agent autonomy 
is an active area of research in the multi-agent 
community. Many architectures and models for 
autonomous agents have been proposed to enable 
agents to reason about their rights and duties, to 
comply with different constraints, to abide by 
regulations or procedures, to behave consistently, to 
cooperate with other (artificial or human) agents... so 
that unwanted or hazardous situations should be 
avoided. 
Consequently distributed control mechanisms have 
to be designed to define what agents' autonomy should 
be, i.e. what the agents should do and may do. In a 
general sense, these rights and duties involve concepts 
such as norms, standards, task and authority sharing 
between artificial and human agents, conflict detection 
and solving, collective performance. The issue also 
concerns the strategies for shifting the initiative and 
distributed control between agents and from agents to 
the human beings and conversely, including proactive 
behaviors. Deciding who should do what and when is a 
complex problem that depends not only on the skills of 
the participants, but also on the current context (health 
of the system, set of tasks to be performed, time 
pressure). 
This is of particular interest for authority sharing 
between robots (e.g. UAVs, UGVs) or automatisms 
(e.g. autopilots) and human operators, social robotics 
(e.g. robot assistance to disabled people), ambient 
intelligence, web agents, e-commerce, interactive 
games.  
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As far as open systems are concerned, social order is 
even more difficult to achieve as it is impossible to 
make assumptions on the agents' internal models, as 
they could have been designed by third-parties. 
According to the Agent Link’s Roadmap [1], Virtual 
Organisation formation and management is a 
challenge. Virtual Organisations (VOs) have been 
identified as the means to release the power of the 
Grid, but well-defined procedures for determining 
when to form new VOs, how to manage them, and 
ultimately how and when to disband them, are still 
missing. Working with complex data in dynamic 
environments, as it is the case of the automation of 
coalition or virtual organizations formations to create a 
dynamic packaging that requires of taking many 
decisions in very short time to take advantage of the 
business opportunities that appear through time, with 
the expectancy to be the first or the winner of every 
single deal at a short term, and gaining business and, at 
a long term, be more profitable. Taking into account 
that all Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems share a few 
characteristics: they are designed to work with data 
sets that are large, complex, or both; to search through 
them and find relevant data; and to look for patterns. 
AI systems are useful for dealing with any dynamic 
environment in which they have to make intelligent 
choices, depending upon the input, among a number of 
possible answers. They also use samples to form 
generalizations about an entire data set and, in some 
cases, make or help make intelligent decisions. 
Potentially, they could even execute tasks. 
Numerical analytics systems find patterns and rules 
in big numerical data sets. They are most useful for 
problems (such as the detection of fraud) that require 
heavy number crunching to distinguish among 
different sets of items. Rule-based decision systems 
use predetermined rules or logic, with or without 
numerical data, to make decisions and determine 
outcomes. They are useful for automating work flows. 
Autonomous execution systems (also known as agents 
or bots), which run continuously, monitor information 
as it arrives—typically from several distributed sites—
and execute specific tasks in response to what they 
find. These systems are most useful for automating 
tasks across organizations by using data shared over 
the Internet, especially when the underlying data are 
structured according to prevailing standards such as the 
Extensible Mark-up Language (XML). The 
development of machine-readable Internet content 
based on XML, which has spawned the use of agent or 
bot technologies, makes it possible to improve a 
company’s information-exchange capabilities to an 
unprecedented extent. Among other possibilities, this 
development means that businesses can automate 
interactions with their partners up and down the value 
chain. 
Although these applications of AI are promising, the 
technology is not right for all information problems. 
First, it is overkill for simple questions and not 
sophisticated enough—yet—for some complex ones. 
Second, since many AI solutions improve performance 
through trial and error, AI is not a good choice for 
mission-critical challenges. However, there are still 
some questions: Are the business processes and 
technologies of the company or the virtual organization 
sufficiently standardized for it to apply AI? In general, 
AI-based tools are most effective when business 
processes and decision logic are consistent and can be 
encoded; furthermore, the technology infrastructure 
must capture, in a timely and accurate way, the data the 
AI system requires. Nonetheless, even organizations 
without standardized process and technology 
infrastructures can apply AI-based tools to isolated 
problems. What parts of the business are best suited to 
AI? The virtual organizations identify activities that are 
complex, repetitive, information based—and not 
mission critical. In those areas, basic AI technologies 
can often be deployed in parallel with existing 
approaches and then iteratively refined and allowed to 
take over more and more of the total activity. 
 
2. Digital ecosystems 
 
This paper introduces a viewpoint to evaluate 
heterogeneity in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) that 
interact to create dynamic packaging and virtual 
organizations. The need to measure heterogeneity or 
diversity is key concept to stabilize ecosystems of 
companies with dynamic deals. The main causes of 
instability that nowadays are foreseen are: imperfect 
data (lack of data, bad data, wrong data, delayed data, 
distorted data, etc), dynamic market (chaotic changing 
demand, and increasing competition), and finally the 
lack of appropriate electronic institutions and 
knowledge derived from immature technologies that do 
not help designers nor managers design automatic 
systems that help dynamic packaging nor virtual 
organizations. 
The term Digital Ecosystem (DE) has been used to 
describe a variety of concepts. However, perhaps the 
most frequent references to Digital Ecosystems arise in 
Artificial Life research. A digital ecosystem is a 
loosely coupled, domain clustered, demand driven 
collaborative system with an environment where each 
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digital (agent) species is proactive and responsive for 
its own benefit or profit. It is a self-organized 
infrastructure with emergent properties aimed at 
creating an open environment for networked 
organizations or agents.  
The focus of our approach is on the autonomy of 
these systems, namely populated by intelligent agents, 
who inherit all the problems mentioned above. Their 
interactions will be grounded in an ecosystem of 
agents, where agents will be self-organised. One 
important question to analyse these Digital Ecosystems 
is the inclusion of interactions of the agents. The 
interactions always exist as for example, the agents that 
trade in electronic commerce have to manage finally 
the negotiation for product delivery to the person or 
institution that these agents represent. 
 
3. Open negotiation environment in digital 
business ecosystems: the nature-inspired 
computing  
 
In the framework of Digital Business Ecosystems, 
(DBE), an EU IST FP 6 integrated project 
investigating the design of a digital business 
ecosystem, which is the enabling technology for the 
Business Ecosystem; the Open Negotiation 
Environment (ONE) project allows organizations to 
create contract agreements in order to supply complex, 
integrated services as a virtual organization (or 
coalition). The ONE project is a STREP project funded 
by the European Commission under the DG-INFSO 
that is geared towards SME’s in order to provide them 
with a trusted, secure and free of charge technological 
environment in which they are able to create tactical 
and strategic alliances; for the ultimate goal of 
pursuing business opportunities and growth. 
An Open Negotiation Environment is defined as 
evolutionary self-organising system aimed at creating a 
digital software environment for small (virtual) 
organisations that support the regional and local 
development by empowering open, distributed and 
adaptive technologies and evolutionary business 
models for small organisations growth. An open-
source distributed environment will support the 
spontaneous evolution, adaptation and composition of 
agent communities.  
This involves taking ideas, concepts, and designs 
from biology and applying them to computing. In 
engineering terms, this would be described as 
discovering biological design modules [2] to be used in 
computer systems. In computing, the best known 
example would be Evolutionary Computing, where the 
concepts of evolutionary theory are used to solve 
optimisation problems, including: Agent-based 
modelling of complex systems; Novel forms of 
distributed evolutionary computing for solving 
optimisation problems; and Neural networks, which 
can be used to provide a learning-based intelligence 
which is suitable for a wide variety of applications.  
The next step would be to develop Biological 
Design Modules from ecological and biological 
systems, and adapt their application in software 
engineering. The ultimate goal would be to create a 
reference library of Biological Design Modules which 
could be used in computing. So, the first step will be to 
identify the characteristics of biological modularity 
that are applicable to computing. 
 
4. Agent autonomy 
 
We adopt the general approach developed in [3], [4] 
(for a general view see [5]). Agent orientation refers to 
a software development perspective that has evolved in 
the past 25 years in the fields of agents and multi-agent 
systems. The basic notion underlying this perspective 
is that of an agent, that is, an entity whose behavior 
deserves to be called flexible, social, and autonomous. 
As an autonomous entity, an agent possesses action 
choice and is at least to some extent capable of 
deciding and acting under self-control. Through its 
emphasis on autonomy, agent orientation significantly 
differs from traditional engineering perspectives such 
as structure orientation or object orientation. These 
perspectives are targeted on the development of 
systems whose behavior is fully determined and 
controlled by external units (e.g., by a programmer at 
design time and/or a user at run time), and thus 
inherently fail to capture the notion of autonomy.  
The simplest notion of autonomy is that of local 
determination. An agent that determines its actions for 
itself based only on its internal state is generally 
considered autonomous, that is, if the determination of 
the agent’s behavior is local and without input from 
other agents, the agent is autonomous. Thus, a reactive 
agent running on a deterministic program would be 
considered autonomous, but since such an agent has no 
intentions, and is incapable of introspection, autonomy 
seems to be a concept of limited usefulness in the 
context of strictly reactive agents. In contrast, other 
investigators in the area of autonomy claim that the 
concept of autonomy is appropriate only for intentional 
agents that have introspective abilities. An intermediate 
position is that autonomy is essentially a social notion, 
which can be understood in terms of social 
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dependencies. 
One aspect of autonomy we could explore is 
individual variation among agents such as agent 
behavior, decision patterns as same as human 
personality [6]. Autonomy is partly a behavioral 
characteristic, and thus varies across agents according 
to individual characteristics. There are individual 
agents who lead and others who prefer to follow. 
Another aspect of autonomy to be considered is inter-
individual dependencies such as dependencies in the 
physical world and inter-individual social 
dependencies. Earlier papers, e.g. [7] have claimed that 
autonomy can be fully understood in terms of social 
independence. While this notion of autonomy is 
satisfactory for simple agents, it becomes inadequate as 
agents become more richly endowed with 
psychological characteristics, in particular, when 
agents can be considered to have individuality. A third 
area of exploration is social regulation and an agent’s 
attitude toward laws, norms, and values in the agent’s 
environment such as found in agent organizations, 
institutions, and general agent society. 
 
5. Environment and autonomy 
 
It is common to refer to individual agents that 
determine their behavior without the influence of other 
individual agents as autonomous. This reflects the 
notion that an autonomous agent is independent and 
self-X stance. These, however, are vague notions. 
What is generally meant is that an autonomous agent is 
empowered to choose to act contrary to the desires of 
other individual agents. Consider two simple 
individual agents each of which must make a choice 
between two options P and Q. The first could make the 
decision based on input from a sensor monitoring some 
physical condition of the individual agent’s 
environment. The second could make the decision 
based on input from another individual agent. The first 
individual agent acts independently of any other 
individual agent, but the second individual agent’s 
action is dependent on the action of another individual 
agent. The first is autonomous with respect to the 
decision, but the second is not autonomous according 
to common notions. Is there any meaningful distinction 
between these individual agents? Both are reacting to 
the condition of an input. Neither has any knowledge 
of other individual agents, social constructs, or social 
structures. Is autonomy a fruitful concept in 
considering such simple individual agents? We, 
therefore, confine our attention to intentional agents, 
and note the positive correlation of usefulness of the 
concept of autonomy with social abilities of the 
individual agent. 
An intentional agent can exhibit various degrees of 
autonomy as determined by how much influence local 
and non-local there is in its decision making process. 
Local limitations on autonomy include constraints on 
intentional and physical abilities, while non-local 
limitations can be exerted through social values, e.g., 
avoid damage to the concerns of other individual 
agents, norms, e.g. keep to the right, legal restrictions, 
e.g., do not exceed the objectives, and the need to 
cooperate. An advocate of a more sophisticated 
position with respect to individual agent autonomy 
might claim that autonomy is a social notion, and as 
such, can only be a property of individual agents 
endowed with social properties interacting with other 
such individual agents in a social situation. Within this 
camp, there can be many variations with one of the 
simplest being that expressed in [7]. It can assert that 
the forms of social autonomy could be defined in terms 
of different forms of social independence, and that 
each component of the architecture or necessary 
condition for a successful action could define a 
dimension or parameter of autonomy, since it can 
define the resources necessary for the goal to achieve. 
The question of what individual agent characteristics 
are required for an agent to be considered social. Could 
an individual agent be intentional to be social? This 
implies that the existence of a dependent social relation 
in an environment is enough to establish the autonomy. 
This is required for the user, the agent or the system? 
Could an individual agent be intentional, selfish, goal 
driven? Could an individual agent be capable of 
introspection, self-awareness and self-evaluation to be 
considered social? 
This approach implies that dependency and 
autonomy are inverses of each other, but it is possible 
that an individual agent could be dependent on another 
agent and yet still remain fully autonomous, if the 
agent has the capability of ending the dependency 
relation at will. This suggests a distinction between 
different levels of autonomy. An individual agent who 
is dependent on another agent, but who retains control 
over that relation has given up first order autonomy, 
but retained some level of autonomy. Dependencies 
likewise can be more complex and subsumed. When an 
individual agent depends on input from other 
individual agent to establish its own dependency 
relations, then this agent has an interaction dependency 
on the second. 
A stronger position on autonomy requires that an 
individual agent not only be social, but also be capable 
of reliably assessing its own capabilities. The claim is 
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that an individual agent is not fully autonomous unless 
it has justification for believing that it is autonomous. 
Capability must be part of autonomy in the sense that 
an individual agent is autonomous with respect to a 
particular task or action only if that agent has the 
ability to complete the task or action. The greater the 
individual agent’s warranted belief in its own 
capability the greater the agent’s autonomy with 
respect to the relevant tasks. 
In some environments, individual agent intentions 
and decisions are highly constrained by the 
environment. For example, an agent (a physical one, or 
robot) driving on a blocked path has fewer options than 
an agent driving on a free way. These constraints limit 
the agent’s autonomy in the sense that a trusted and 
self-aware agent will reconsider activities that have a 
sufficiently high probability of resulting in negative or 
undesirable consequences. On the other hand, if the 
environment is safe for the agent, then choices are 
unconstrained, and autonomy is expanded. This 
example illustrates a common sense idea about the 
relationship between autonomy and the extent of an 
individual agent’s choice, namely, the larger the 
number of choices that an individual agent has 
available the greater the agent’s autonomy. While it is 
certainly the case that an agent with no choice has no 
autonomy, the converse does not hold. Consider an 
individual agent presented with a choice between an 
action that will cause its maximum objectives to be 
completed and an action that will affect the user’s 
petitions. How much autonomy does such an 
individual agent have? Autonomy evaluation must 
consider quality of choices as well as number of 
choices. Indeed, having too many choices can be 
detrimental, if the individual agent does not have the 
resources to properly evaluate those choices. 
 
6. Individual agent variations 
 
Individual agents vary in their autonomy. These 
variations are due, in part, to differences in behavior, 
negotiation style, or individuality [6]. In the case of 
agents, we can take individuality to be a collection of 
persistent patterns of behavior such as trust and 
cooperation. The agent community has begun 
developing individual agents with synthetic personality 
[8], mentioning laziness, helpfulness, dominance, and 
conflict checking as agent personality traits [9]. 
Obviously, individual traits contribute to the individual 
agent’s capability of autonomy. For a rough 
understanding of individual variations of autonomy we 
suggest two dimensions or axes. The first dimension is 
a dominance/rigidity/flexibility scale. Dominance 
constrains agent interactions by demanding: (i) 
certainty, (ii) independence, (iii) norms and values, (iv) 
boundary precision, and (v) control. Highly dominant 
individual agents demand precision and are less 
flexible. One aspect of this kind of rigidity is the need 
for certainty of effects of actions (by self and others) 
and certainty of information available to them. With 
higher certainty, dominant individual agents are more 
confident in their actions and rely on their choices. 
When there is a lot of on uncertainty, an individual 
agent may not feel in control of its environment and 
may feel less confident about its decisions. Another 
aspect is the need for independence, and/or the 
avoidance of dependence. A highly dependent 
personality requires the assistance of others. A 
dependent agent may require constant direction and 
reinforcement. 
In the opposite extreme, an independent individual 
agent will avoid assistance from others, and be fiercely 
dominant, which can affect its ability to be part of a 
team. Another aspect of rigidity is pointless adherence 
to rules, orders, laws, conventions, norms, and values. 
A rigid individual agent will be unyielding in 
following rules. On the other hand, an individual may 
seek to avoid rules and regulations. The formal aspect 
of rigidity is boundary maintenance. Individual agents 
differ in their tolerance of limits, sharing norms and 
cooperation, and some tolerate flexible values while 
others demand precise boundaries and limits. A more 
complex aspect of rigidity is the need for control and 
dominance. This is related to the need for a particular 
level of independence. Some individual agents have 
higher need to be in control while others are capable of 
reaching goals with less control. This could be 
expressed with a German expression: Auftragstaktik. In 
this case the user (a human or another agent) gives 
their subordinate agents a clearly defined goal (a 
mission or objective to achieve) and the tools, 
information or elements needed to accomplish that goal 
with a time within which the goal must be reached. The 
subordinate agents then implement the order 
independently. The subordinate agent is given, to a 
large extent, the planning initiative and a freedom in 
execution which allows flexibility in execution. It is 
more of a method of leadership: a much different grade 
of autonomy in a complex environment with 
distributed control. Then, direct orders should be an 
exception in this case, while tasks (or missions) should 
be the standard instrument of achieving complex 
objectives. But clearly the relationship between rigidity 
and independence is in need of further investigation.  
A second axe or dimension is a scale representing 
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submission/capacity/perception which is the individual 
agent’s capabilities to objectively perceive an agent’s 
attributes that constrain interaction, which will be 
measured on submission as a competence attribute. 
Individual agents that do not accurately perceive 
uncertainties can believe that they are in deterministic 
environments and may conceive of their autonomy 
being circumscribed. Those that perceive more 
uncertainties are better able to form a more complex 
sense of autonomy. Individual agents, who see they to 
be highly dependent, will sense relatively lower levels 
of autonomy as opposed to those who are oblivious to 
these dependencies. Sensing the extent to which an 
individual agent’s decisions are guided by trust, norms, 
and values can give an individual agent a sense of 
security or/and lack of freedom. The ability to perceive 
control is another aspect of an individual agent’s 
capacity. Sensing higher levels of control is generally 
reassuring for an individual agent and will lead to a 
sense of freedom and experience of higher autonomy. 
The exact relationship between distributed control 
and autonomy appears to be very complex. At one end 
of the capacities dimension are individual agents with 
the highest capacities and in the other end there are 
individual agents with the lowest capacities. 
 
7. Environmental variations 
 
Whereas freedom is implied from autonomy, 
freedom to act or decide does not imply autonomy. 
Freedom is the social component of autonomy. 
Autonomy is also more than this external sense of 
freedom. An individual agent must satisfy internal 
conditions, beyond socially extended autonomy, in 
order to be autonomous. Autonomy can interpreted as a 
combination of socially warranted freedoms to behave 
and internally perceived capabilities to decide. When 
individual agents are in groups, organizations, and 
institutions, their individual agent autonomy is altered 
by the properties of the group. This effect may be 
caused by their membership, their representation of 
group to others, or their participation in collective 
behavior. In settings where social obligations are rigid 
and matter a great deal, autonomy tends to be how an 
individual agent relates to those social rules. In 
contrast, there are many environments where few or no 
constraints or strict rules and norms of conduct to 
frame agent behavior. In such environments, individual 
agents are free to be ‘wild’, non social or unaffiliated. 
Individual agents, as members of groups, are subject 
to the social climate within which they are embedded. 
Their memberships and allegiances constrain their 
decision making and provide them with a set of 
behaviors, rights, duties, and obligations governed by a 
set of norms and values. This may augment or detract 
from their individual agent autonomies. Autonomies 
are affected by the individual agent’s degree of 
commitment and loyalty to the groups to which they 
belong. As we explored above in our consideration of 
individual agent variation, individual agents do vary in 
their tendency toward commitment and loyalty. 
However, here we are suggesting that the existence of 
groups to which an individual agent may belong 
produces a set of attributes for an agent’s autonomy 
deliberation. 
We point to a need to develop reasoning methods for 
autonomy that account for an agent’s membership in 
groups. Given that an individual agent is a member of a 
particular group, then it represents the group in its 
interaction with non-group members, the individual 
agent assumes the group’s goals and autonomy and 
augments it to its own. A representative must embody 
the essential components of the group it is representing 
and use it in reasoning about the group’s autonomy. 
In collective action or collective decision-making, 
the group as a whole owns the action or decision. An 
individual agent’s autonomy toward the collective 
action or decision can only be conceived of as a 
contribution. This can be in terms of voting or vetoing 
power in the case of decision-making. In the case of 
physical or social action, an agent’s autonomy is 
represented by the extent to which the individual agent 
facilitates the group’s intent. 
 
8. Limits of autonomy 
 
Agents that interact with humans must be designed 
with particular attention to human safety and to not 
endanger human goals as well. Problems can arise 
when agents are fully autonomous and their actions are 
un-interruptible. Conversely, problems can also arise 
when an agent pays too much attention to human input 
when the human has insufficient knowledge of how the 
agent operates. Both agents that are excessively 
passive and agents that are excessively active can be 
harmful. Humans in the loop of agents need to be able 
to adjust the activity level of agents dynamically, that 
is, the autonomy level of agents needs to be adjustable. 
This seems to suggest a multi-tiered approach to agent 
autonomy. Agents may operate with certain nominal 
autonomies under normal circumstances but under 
heightened safety or concern conditions, agents should 
be switched to other modes when authorized human 
users manipulate their autonomy. Changing agent roles 
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in interaction has been reported in mixed initiative 
work [10]. Another promising area is empowering 
agents to reason about shared norms and values [11]. 
Since accounting for all contingencies is not realistic, 
agents need to have the ability to reason for themselves 
about whether their human supervisor would approve 
of their choices and assumed autonomies. 
An agent’s assumed level of autonomy may have 
unintended effects on other agents in a multi-agent 
setting. When tasks among agents are coupled, 
cooperating agents need to use a shared notion of 
autonomy to take into account one another’s actions. 
Sharing autonomy is useful for harmonizing agent 
autonomies in order to account for one another’s 
influence and to avoid negative influences [12]. 
Collective autonomy requires mutual trust among 
agents. Groups of agents may develop a notion of 
autonomy that belongs to the entire group. Individual 
agents will conceive of autonomy of their group. 
However, the group’s autonomy can only be altered by 
collective actions such as negotiation. There can be 
problems when an individual agent in such a group 
misunderstands the group’s autonomy when it 
represents the group. This can cause harm to the group 
or others. 
 
9. Autonomy in a complex world 
 
To date autonomy still is a poorly understood 
property of computational systems, both in theoretical 
and practical terms, and among all properties usually 
associated with multi-agent system (MAS) it is this 
property being most controversially discussed. On the 
one hand, it is argued that there is a broad range of 
applications in complex domains such as e-commerce, 
ubiquitous computing, and supply chain management 
which can hardly be realized without taking autonomy 
as a key ingredient, and that it is first of all agent 
autonomy which enables the decisive features of agent-
oriented software, namely robustness, flexibility and 
the emergence of novel solutions of problems at run 
time. On the other hand, it is argued seemingly 
convincingly that autonomy mainly is a source of 
undesirable and chaotic system behavior. Obviously, 
without a clarification of these two positions, it is 
unlikely that MAS (having autonomy as a real property 
and not just as a catchy label) become broadly accepted 
in real-world, industrial and commercial applications. 
Artificial intelligence paradigms today are moving 
towards a more distributed agent-based architecture. It 
is argued that when intelligence is approached in such 
an incremental manner, the reliance on global 
representations and reasoning disappears [13], [14], 
and [15]. Specifically, the agents are physical or 
computational entities that are (i) situated in an 
environment, (ii) posses resources of their own, (iii) 
can perceive the environment, (iv) have practically no 
representation of their environment, and, (v) execute 
behaviors which may offer useful services. 
Autonomous agents are not directed by commands 
from a user. Instead, they are directed by a set of 
likelihoods to behave in a particular way. Autonomous 
agency became popular with the work of Brooks [13], 
[14], challenged the deliberative paradigm in AI (the 
classical planning paradigm that was also slow due to 
brute force search) by building stimulus-response 
based entities on this subsumed architecture. 
 
10. From Wolf to Poodle 
 
Now, we address the problem of building and 
monitoring a long-living digital ecosystem inhabited 
by autonomous agents; the agent has a large number of 
relatively complex and varying tasks to perform [16]. 
Biology suggests some ideas about the way animals 
deal with a variety of tasks: brains are made of 
specialized and complementary areas/modules; skills 
are spread over modules. On the one hand, distributing 
functions and representations has immediate 
advantages: parallel processing implies reaction speed-
up; a relative independence between modules gives 
more robustness. Both properties might clearly 
increase the agent’s efficiency. On the other hand, the 
fact of distributing a system raises a fundamental issue: 
how does the organization process of the modules 
happen during the life-time? And in both cases are 
relaying on the autonomy of the agents system.  
Agents are individual entities with true autonomy or 
mere ‘domesticated’ ones? They are obedient and 
dependent or autonomous and free? Domestication is 
the process of hereditary reorganization of wild 
animals and plants into domestic and cultivated forms 
according to the interests of people. In its strictest 
sense it refers to the initial stage of human mastery of 
wild animals and plants. The fundamental distinction 
of domesticated animals and plants from their wild 
ancestors is that they are created by human labour to 
meet specific requirements or whims and are adapted 
to the conditions of continuous care and solicitude 
people maintain for them. 
Domestication has played an enormous part in the 
development of mankind and its material culture. It has 
resulted in the appearance of agriculture as a special 
form of animal and plant production. It is precisely 
those animals and plants that became objects of 
agricultural activity that have undergone the greatest 
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changes when compared with their wild ancestors. 
After wild dogs learned not to bite the hand that fed 
them, French poodles weren’t far behind. Some argue 
that humans adopted wolf pups and that natural 
selection favoured those less aggressive and better at 
begging for food. Others say dogs domesticated 
themselves by adapting to a new niche—human 
rubbish dumps. Scavenger canids that were less likely 
to escape by running away, especially because of 
danger or fear, from people survived in this niche, and 
succeeding generations became increasingly tame. All 
that was selected for was that one trait—the ability to 
eat in proximity to people. At the molecular level not 
much changed at all: The DNA makeup of wolves and 
dogs is almost identical. The dog evolved in the 
company of humans and cannot exist without them. 
Even the vast majority living “wild” as village 
scavengers depends on proximity to humans. Further, 
domestication is a rare event requiring special skill, but 
the dog is a domesticated wolf. Evolutionary biologists 
are looking at dog DNA for evidence that even a toy 
poodle is a wolf in dog's clothing [17]. Domestication 
is a phenomenon whereby a wild biological organism 
is habituated to survive in the company of human 
beings. Domesticated animals, plants, and other 
organisms are those whose collective behavior, life 
cycle, or physiology has been altered as a result of their 
breeding and living conditions being under human 
control for multiple generations.  
In a related way the notion of domestication is used 
in domestication theory that describes the process of 
the 'taming' or appropriation of technology by its users. 
Animal species must meet some criteria in order to be 
considered for domestication: (i) Pleasant disposition, 
(ii) Temperament disposition to obey, (iii) Modifiable 
social hierarchy — Social creatures that recognize a 
hierarchy of dominance can be raised to recognize a 
human as its pack leader. A herding instinct arguably 
aids in domesticating animals: tame one and others will 
follow, regardless of chiefdom. To deal with the 
increasing complexity of large-scale computer systems, 
computers must learn to manage themselves, in 
accordance with high-level guidance from humans and 
a vision that has been referred to as autonomic 
computing. Here one sets out to adopt a bio-inspired 
vision to develop “wild” agents able to fulfill the 
exigencies of the total autonomy, in order to obtain 
from them a type of “domesticated” agents which 
make the tasks that are entrusted to him. In a few 
words, your French poodle will obey your order about 
your sofa, with a wolf you must fight. The bio-inspired 
lesson is that if we build a complex agent system we 
should decide between a wild, really autonomous 
entity (a “running with wolves” agent) or a more 
domesticated one (like a toy poodle acting on behalf of 
the users), but highly dependent entity (on users, 
programmers and maintenance). 
 
11. Cognition, Robots and Autonomy 
 
Research in robotics has traditionally emphasized 
low-level sensing and control tasks including sensory 
processing, path planning, and manipulator design and 
control. In contrast, research in cognitive robotics is 
concerned with endowing robots and software agents 
with higher level cognitive functions that enable them 
to reason, act and perceive in changing, incompletely 
known, and unpredictable environments. Such robots 
must, for example, be able to reason about goals, 
actions, when to perceive and what to look for, the 
cognitive states of other agents, time, resources, 
collaborative task execution, etc. In short, cognitive 
robotics is concerned with integrating reasoning, 
perception, and action within a uniform theoretical and 
implementation framework (using methods drawn from 
logic, probability and decision theory, reinforcement 
learning, game theory, etc.). 
The use of robots and software agents is becoming 
more and more widespread, with many commercial 
products on the market. Complex applications and the 
need for effective interaction with humans are 
increasing demand for robots that are capable of 
deliberation and other high-level cognitive functions. 
Models from cognitive science and techniques from 
machine learning are being used to enable robots to 
extend their knowledge and skills. Combining results 
from mainstream robotics and computer vision with 
those from knowledge representation and reasoning, 
machine learning, and cognitive science has and will 
continue to be central to research in cognitive robotics. 
The current scene in cognitive science is characterized 
by a growing interest in the ecological-embodied-
enactive approach [18], and [19]. According to this 
view cognition is best characterized as belonging to 
embodied, situated agents. In this approach we 
consider possible implications of the enactive approach 
for future agent (and robotic) ecosystems. In particular, 
the enactive approach in perception would lead to 
agents and robots whose ability to perceive not only 
depends on, but is constituted by, their possession of 
certain sensor motor skills [20]. Noë argues that 
perception and perceptual consciousness depend on 
capacities for action and thought, that perception is a 
kind of thoughtful activity. We propose to consider the 
question to what extent an embodied and situated 
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individual agent (or robot) should and could develop 
its own subjective point of view. 
 
12. Background and roots 
 
Since the mid-1980's, there has been rapidly 
growing interest in research studying the behavioral 
and evolutionary foundations of cognition and 
intelligence. Studies of computation as an emergent 
phenomenon, cognition as adaptive behavior, 
coordinated perception and action, and evolutionary 
learning techniques (such as genetic algorithms) can all 
be broadly classified as work in Artificial Life. The 
study of systems which exhibit adaptive behavior has 
received growing attention from workers in fields as 
diverse as ethology, robotics, neuroscience, cognitive 
science, economics and linguistics.  
Increasing numbers of Artificial Intelligence 
researchers are addressing such fundamental issues, as 
an adjunct to the more usual focus on high-level 
cognitive functions such as natural-language 
understanding or planning for complex tasks.  
Work in this area is often holistic: complete 
autonomous agents are studied as cognitive systems 
interacting with their environments. This places 
emphasis on understanding mechanisms responsible 
for generation of behavior, rather than on individual 
agent cognitive functions; and hence on understanding 
the interactions between the agent and its environment, 
rather than on isolated disembodied intellects. The 
term autonomous agents include animals, mobile 
robots, and software agents inhabiting virtual realities. 
Artificial autonomous agents are more commonly 
known as animats.  
Methods of study, and mechanisms developed, vary 
depending on the phenomena addressed: rule-based 
systems, neural networks and simple finite-state 
automata have all been employed with success. We are 
interested in understanding cognition in ethological, 
ecological, and evolutionary contexts. Some of our 
studies involve building autonomous mobile robots, 
while others take place in complex computer 
simulations that provide virtual realities for simulated 
agents. Some of our work also addresses wider issues 
in complex adaptive systems, examples include: 
emergent computation, bio-inspired agent systems, 
theoretical and philosophical issues and the global 
dynamics of complex digital ecosystems. 
 
13. Enaction in agent systems 
 
The current scene in computer science is 
characterized by a growing interest in the ecological-
embodied-enactive approach [21]-[25]. According to 
this view agent cognition is best characterized as 
belonging to embodied, situated agents. In the digital 
ecosystem would be possible implications of this 
complex approach for future digital systems. In 
particular, the enactive approach in perception would 
lead to agents whose ability to perceive not only 
depends on, but is constituted by, their possession of 
certain sensor skills [23]–[25]. In the future will be 
necessary to consider the question to what extent an 
autonomous (embodied and situated, also) agent could 
develop its own subjective point of view, and how the 
users will cope with that trait. 
Classical definitions fell prey to the problem, as 
Jerry Fodor [28]-[30] put it, that no one has ever 
managed to come up with any knock-down definitions. 
Perhaps the biggest error with classical approach was 
the focus on static definitions. If we treat concepts as 
dynamic entities, constantly (if often only 
incrementally) in flux as an agent interacts with her 
environment and the other members of her society 
(population, community), might there be some more 
mix? Rather than being a priori representations, 
concepts might be seen as continually enacted: 
synchronized patterns of association between the 
mental world of an agent and the organization of her 
environment, dependent both on how the agent is 
situated and embodied. In discussing these enactive 
definitions, the goal need not be a complete account of 
concepts but only one important component in such an 
account: an account that may also leave room for an 
updated version of imagism, that other longstanding 
tradition in theories of concepts. 
The term enaction was proposed by Francisco 
Varela, see [19], in order to designate a new paradigm 
in cognitive science, based not on the metaphor of the 
computer as in classical cognitivism, but instead on the 
metaphor of living organisms. The aim is to contribute 
to the maturation of this new paradigm and to the 
formation of an identifiable application in digital 
ecosystems and agent community. 
Any paradigm in cognitive science must meet two 
main requirements: the theoretical core must provide a 
principled answer to the enigma of the relation 
between matter and mind; and the paradigm must 
provide for trans-disciplinary articulation, notably 
between the domains of philosophy, psychology, 
linguistics, neurosciences and Artificial Intelligence. 
The initial proposals of Maturana and Varela [31], 
[32], where Cognition = Life = Autopoiesis, should be 
critically explored, in order to identify their limitations 
196
Authorized licensed use limited to: UNIVERSITAT DE GIRONA. Downloaded on May 8, 2009 at 07:10 from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply.
with a view to overcoming them. In particular, it will 
be crucial to avoid the trap of a restriction to low-level 
sensori-motor cognition, by ensuring the passage to 
high-level cognition such as language, consciousness 
and culture.  
Finally, it will be important to clarify the relation 
between the paradigm of enaction, and other related 
approaches: in particular phenomenology; the 
philosophy of life and individuation [33], [34]; 
constructivism [35]-[38]; psychology; the ecological 
approach [39]; autonomous robotics, etc. being this list 
neither extensive nor exclusive. 
Enactive interactions are inspired by a fundamental 
concept of interaction that has not been exploited by 
other approaches to the design of human-computer 
interface technologies. Mainly, interfaces have been 
designed to present information via symbols, or icons. 
In the symbolic approach, information is stored as 
words, mathematical symbols or other symbolic 
systems, while in the iconic approach information is 
stored in the form of visual images, such as diagrams 
and illustrations. Enactive knowledge is neither 
symbolic nor iconic. It is direct, in the sense that it is 
natural and intuitive, based on experience and the 
perceptual consequences of motor acts. Enactive 
knowledge is information gained through perception-
action interactions with the environment. Examples 
include information gained by grasping an object, by 
hefting a stone, or by walking around an obstacle that 
occludes our view. It is gained through intuitive 
movements, of which we often are not aware. Enactive 
knowledge is inherently multimodal, because motor 
actions alter the stimulation of multiple perceptual 
systems. Enactive knowledge is essential in tasks such 
as driving a car, dancing, playing a musical instrument, 
modeling objects from clay, performing sports, and so 
on. 
Enaction is a term coined in psychology [40] and 
used in a particular biological approach [19], according 
to which cognition is fundamentally a feature of living 
organisms in a dynamic adaptive relationship with their 
environment. Only recently the term has gained 
widespread currency in domains such as human-
computer interaction. In the same kind of view, the 
physicist Jean Petitot [41] proposes the idea of a 
Phenophysics, based on the theory of Morphogenesis 
of the mathematician R. Thom [42], according to 
which the necessary condition for categorization to 
occur, is the presence of specific singularities in the 
dynamics of physical sensorial events, on which 
categorization can get a grip. These theories are used in 
signal processing, shape recognition and can be used in 
extraction of emotive patterns in signals. Other related 
concepts are presently developed also in relationship 
with artificial intelligence and robotics. The proper 
domain is that of the so-called embodied cognition, 
which gives much importance to action and perception 
in the definition and simulation of intelligent 
behaviors, by focusing the attention on parallel, 
distributed architectures, on adaptive behavior of 
different kinds (not only high order symbolic 
capacities) and on the possibilities offered by the 
dynamic systems modeling of behavior. 
 
14. Final remarks 
 
The focus during the developing of an Open 
Negotiation Environment should be on the autonomy 
of the agents pursuing their goals in the Digital 
Ecosystem, using bio-inspired computing, agent-based 
modelling and social networks based intelligence [43]. 
This bio-inspired approach is applied in combination 
with service orientated architectures to support 
business ecosystems. Current negotiation platforms, 
such as Business-to-Business electronic marketplaces 
and Internet trading platforms are centrally managed 
and not yet fully trusted or too expensive for SME’s. 
The solution in a negotiation environment should be 
affordable, open, not centrally controlled, and 
supporting the sharing of knowledge via flexible 
security and trust policies. The agents would be able to 
learn and evolve with the changing conditions in an 
open-source solution ensuring transparency and 
sustainability. By using the highly autonomous agents 
in a complex environment all players (users, clients 
and others agents) will benefit from reduction of 
dependence to behave and transactional costs. 
We have argued that autonomy is not uniformly 
conceptualized, and that an account of autonomy must 
also account for variations between individual agents 
and environments. This variability (between individual 
agents, populations, communities, ecosystems) is a key 
factor to the affect autonomy, and is determined strictly 
by agent interactions and dependencies. This work 
proposes to select and design complex features for 
agents that must match the requirements of their 
environment for autonomous behavior. 
Our approach emphasize, from the start-point of 
fundamental DE’s [43], the study of how reciprocal 
agent fluxes across utterly different environment and 
digital ecosystems can affect the structure and 
dynamics of local agent interactions and emphasize the 
need to account for the resulting indirect interaction 
between them. These approach emphasize the need to 
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think across ecosystems when studying community 
dynamics and managing agent populations with 
complex cycles. These DEs are created primarily to 
investigate aspects of biological and other complex 
systems [44]-[46], rather than to provide a service for 
human users. Newly applications and developments are 
placing DE’s in the mainstream of everyday life, from 
business to leisure. 
A further body of theory treats ecosystems as 
complex adaptive systems [47]. These models provide 
a theoretical basis for the occurrence of self-
organization in both digital and real ecosystems. Self-
organization results when interactions among agents 
and their environment giving rise to complex nonlinear 
behavior. It is this property that provides the 
underlying potential for scalable problem-solving in a 
digital environment. 
By comparing and contrasting theoretical ecology 
with the anticipated requirements of digital 
ecosystems, we have examined how ecological features 
may emerge in some systems designed for adaptive 
problem solving. Specifically, we suggested that a 
digital ecosystem, like a real ecosystem, will usually 
consist of self-organized agents that interact both with 
one another and with an environment. Agent 
population dynamics and evolution, spatial and 
network interactions, and complex dynamic fitness 
landscapes will all influence the behavior of these 
systems. Many of these properties can be understood 
via well-known ecological models [48], and [49]. 
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